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Abstract
Given inelastic demand for labour-intensive public services, the size of government de-
pends positively on labour costs. OECD data exhibit a strong statistical association between
government size and the business-sector labour share of income. When the labour share is
instrumented with measures of technological change, institutional variation and predeter-
mined data it continues to positively impact government size. In contrast, transfer spending
is una¤ected by the labour share. The evidence is consistent with the idea that the recent
decline in the labour share has contributed to the slowdown in the growth of government
witnessed in much of the post-war era.
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1 Introduction
Explanations of the size of government have historically focussed on its growth. However,
as shown in gure 1, the share of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the
OECD has if anything declined in recent years. The 10 year average up until 2007 was lower
than that up to 1998 in all but ve out of 29 countries in the sample.1 Notwithstanding
important cyclical features in many of the countries it is remarkable how growth in relative
government size was the norm from the early 1960s to around the mid-1980s, and thereafter,
more-or-less universally ceased - albeit at di¤erent levels in di¤erent countries.
The literature distinguishes between demand- and supply-side explanations for the growth
of government.2 Pickering and Rockey (2011) attribute the increases and the divergence in
government size observed in the earlier part of the sample as due principally to demand-side
factors. In their analysis the income elasticity of demand for public services exceeds unity,
as in Wagners (1893) law, once the median voter has reached a certain level of income,
and income elasticity di¤ers with ideology. Government grows with income, converging to
a steady state that depends on ideology. This theory successfully explains the growth and
divergence observed in the data up until 1998, but the recent downward movements noted
above suggest other factors at work.3
1The exceptions are France, Iceland, Japan, Korea (a notable outlier in the sample) and Portugal. The
data are truncated at 2007 because after this date nancial bail-outs and scal stimuli have led to signicant
increases in total outlays in many countries.
2Holsey and Borcherding (1997), Lybeck (1988) and Shelton (2007) survey the extensive literature on the
size of government.
3Other demand side explanations include demographic change (e.g. Sanz and Velázquez, 2007), and
the median voters relative income (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). However, in both cases data would point
towards ongoing increases rather than decreases in relative government size. In the former instance, OECD
populations have continued to age, and in the instance of the Meltzer and Richard mechanism, measured
inequality in the before-tax income distribution has increased in many countries. Both trends would point
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This paper argues that supply side factors, in particular labour costs, are also impor-
tant, and thus proposes a new explanation that can help to account for the more recent
contractions in government size. The seminal supply-side explanation of government growth
is Baumols (1967) cost disease: costs are pushed up over time because of rising wages and
stagnant productivity in the public sector. Given inelastic demand for public services the
relative size of government grows.4 However, at the present time of writing private sector
wage growth is low in the OECD.5 Furthermore in recent years, labours income share in the
private sector has declined in many countries.6 It seems plausible that a declining labour
share implies lower production costs in labour-intensive sectors of the economy. Arguably
output in many areas of the public sector is labour-intensive to the extent that labour is
output in some instances, for example in nursing and one-to-one teaching, so if labour costs
exogenously fall then so does government size when demand is inelastic. Nonetheless it
should be acknowledged that whilst a lower labour share is not a cure for cost disease (ulti-
mately this depends on the sources of technological progress in the economy as well as the
elasticity of demand), it does potentially represent a palliative.7
To formally analyze the impact of the labour share on government size we combine
two canonical models, the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth model, and Baumols (1967)
to increased demand for redistribution rather than government shrinkage.
Another important potential driver is globalization, which is controlled for in the analysis below.
4Borcherding (1985) estimates that 31% of the observed growth of total government size in the U.S.
between 1902 and 1978 was due to the Baumol e¤ect. Borcherding et al (2004) and Sanz and Velázquez
(2007) nd similar evidence in the panel of OECD countries.
5For example see Cowen (2011) or Gordon (2012).
6This phenomenon has not gone unnoticed in the academic literature, e.g. see Azmat et al (2012) and
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
7If productivity growth is driven by the private sector alone, then a lower labour share could o¤set rising
relative costs of the public sector, but clearly the labour share cannot fall indenitely.
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model of a two-sector economy, where the two sectors are the private (business) sector, and
the labour-intensive government sector. Wages costs are governed by the private sector,
and the technology of production therein. Using this apparatus, a fall in labours income
share is found to have two opposing e¤ects on the expenditure share of government in the
economy. Firstly, given a labour-intensive public sector, lower labour costs straightforwardly
mean lower taxes and a smaller government holding all else equal. However, a lower labour
share also implies higher steady state capital and output levels in the private sector. Under
Baumolian demand, which requires that real government output keeps pace with real private
output in volume terms, increased private sector output puts upward pressure on taxes.
The relationship between government size and the labour share is investigated empirically
using a panel of OECD countries, augmenting the analysis of Pickering and Rockey (2011)
with data up until 2007 for the full set of OECD members and including the labour share
as a potential explanatory variable and using a wide range of econometric specications.
Following the theory the labour share is measured as the share of income going to labour
in the business sector.8 We readily acknowledge that satisfactory identication of a causal
relationship between government size and the labour share is di¢cult given the myriad
underlying drivers of both variables. The labour share and the size of government are
both endogenous macroeconomic phenomena. As we discuss below there are many potential
mechanisms linking one to the other: there may be reverse causality from government size
to the labour share, and indeed there may be separate exogenous forces driving both.
In order to address the endogeneity problem in the labour share, a number of separate
8The labour share measure is described in more detail below, but it is important to emphasize early that
it corresponds to wages and salaries as a share of value added in the private sector alone and not the public
sector. Gollin (2002) addresses measurement issues in the context of international data.
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instrumental variables are employed in the empirical analysis. An advantage of using more
than one instrument is that overidentication tests of the associated exclusion restrictions be-
come available. The principal instrumental variable used encapsulates technological change
and is drawn from Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), who nd that international di¤erences
in the extent to which the labour share has declined are due foremost to di¤erences in the
extent to which the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods has declined.9
According to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) the observed fall in the relative price of in-
vestment goods is due to exogenous technological change, inducing rms to shift away from
labour towards capital. Their relative price variable, constructed from data drawn from the
Penn World Table is thus our rst instrument.
A second instrument exploits the creation of the Schengen area in Europe as a potential
source of exogenous institutional variation in the labour share. The Schengen area was
established in 1995, entailing the dismantling of border controls between certain European
nations.10 This has been documented by Zimmerman (1995) as designed to simultaneously
increase intra-EU migration, whilst reducing inward-migration from outside the area. The
creation of the Schengen area undoubtedly has had important implications for the labour
market, and labour mobility both into and within Europe. On the one hand a larger, and
more mobile workforce might be expected to increase the bargaining power of employers for
the simple reason that they have a larger pool of workers from which to draw on. On the
9The declining labour share has also been attributed to globalization (e.g. see Guerriero and Sen, 2012,
and Decreuse and Maarek, 2015). However, increased openness has separately also been proposed as a direct
driver of government size (e.g. Cameron, 1978, Rodrik (1998) and Epifani and Gancia, 2012) hence the
exclusion restriction is unlikely to be satised.
10In particular within the sample of countries examined in this paper, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland are all part of the
Schengen area.
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other hand, the raised external barriers could reduce the potential labour supply, raising
labour bargaining power. But in either case the creation of the single market represents a
possible source of exogenous variation in the labour share. Figure 2 contrasts the movement
of the average business-sector labour share over time within the Schengen area against the
average of the rest of the sample.11 Whilst there was a small, though systematic di¤erence
between the two groups of countries prior to the early 1990s, a clear divergence appears
thereafter: the labour share fell to a lesser degree within the Schengen area than outside.
It seems likely that features specic to the EU, including the creation of the Schengen area
plausibly explain the dampened reduction observed in the Schengen area.12 The creation of
the European single market is in large part a consequence of geography and history, hence
may be treated as an exogenous event, one with signicant repercussions for the labour
market.
Neither of these instruments are bullet-proof. It is possible to make a case for their exo-
geneity, but it must be acknowledged that technological change may a¤ect the demand for
government services directly as well as through production costs. Membership of the Schen-
gen area was an endogenous political decision which may also be related to government size.
For these reasons we report exclusion restriction (overidentication) tests in the analysis.
Furthermore and in addition to the two instruments detailed, we also use the lag of the
labour share as a further instrumental variable.13 This captures the predetermined element
11Note this gure excludes former communist East European countries.
12The start of the divergence appears to predate the signing of the Schengen agreement by two or three
years. It is possible that European institutional change (with similar geographic constituents to the Schengen
area) around this time may instead be responsible. Alternatively wage-negotiating may have been forward-
looking to some extent. We take the Schengen agreement as the relevant date of institutional change because
of its explicit implications for the labour market.
13Precedents where lagged regressors are used as instruments include Barro (2001) and Yogo (2004).
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of the labour share. Whilst there may be reasons to expect that the current government size
a¤ects or is co-determined with the current labour share, it is harder to argue that current
government size will a¤ect or is co-determined with the lagged labour share data.
The empirical analysis covers results using both annual data following previous work,
and ve year averages of the data. One important endogeneity problem arises from spurious
correlation over the business cycle: both the labour share and government size plausibly
move with the cycle, and the use of averages over 5 year periods should substantially remove
this problem.
In the empirical analysis the size of the government is consistently found to be positively
associated with the business-sector labour share of income. This is a new nding in the liter-
ature. This relationship is robust across the wide set of di¤erent econometric specications
employed. In particular, both when the labour share is instrumented, and when the data
are averaged across ve year intervals to eliminate cyclical variation, the results found using
more basic techniques hold up.
A further test of the central hypothesis is provided by disaggregating total public expen-
diture. The main argument of the paper applies to labour-intensive production sectors of
government. However, a considerable portion of total government expenditure in the OECD
sample consists of transfers. These expenditures (generally) do not require labour inputs,
at least not to the same extent as produced public services. If the link between government
size and the labour share is due to production costs, as proposed here, then the auxiliary
hypothesis is that there should not be a link between transfers and the labour share. Using
the same econometric methods as used to analyze government size, we indeed nd no statis-
tical relationship between total expenditure on social benets as a fraction of GDP and the
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labour share.
The paper also addresses how expenditure across di¤erent government departments might
be a¤ected by changes in labour costs. There is interesting heterogeneity across departments
in terms of statistical signicance. Importantly it is expenditure within labour-intensive
sectors, and in which it is plausible to argue that demand for services is inelastic, that is
more strongly related to the labour income share.
The next section theoretically analyzes how the size of government changes with the
labour share. Section 3 contains the empirical work and section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The theoretical analysis combines the standard neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956)
and Swan (1956) and the two-sector model of Baumol (1967). Sector one is the public sector
and sector two is the private sector. Formally:
Y1t = A1tL1t (1)
Y2t = (A2tL2t)
1−α
Kα2t (2)
where Y1t and Y2t are respectively output in the public and private sectors, L1t and L2t are the
respective employment levels, and A1t = A1e
r1t and A2t = A2e
r2t represent exogenous labour-
augmented productivity in the two sectors, and t is a time index. Note that in Baumols
original paper A1 is constant (r1 = 0), though here for generality productivity growth may
be higher in either sector. Capital K2t is required for private sector production, whilst public
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sector output, for simplicity, is assumed to only depend on (potentially augmented) labour.
We use a Cobb-Douglas specication for private sector production because as is well known
under competitive markets α is the capital share of output, whilst 1−α is the labour share.
The private sector evolves following the Solow-Swan model. Private sector capital accu-
mulates according to
.
K2t = s (Y2t (1− τ))− δK2t (3)
where s is the exogenous savings rate, δ is the exogenous depreciation rate, and τ is the
tax rate (which funds public sector expenditure). For simplicity public sector employees
are assumed to not own capital, hence gross investment s (Y2t (1− τ)) depends only on
(disposable) private sector income. This very familiar set-up leads to a steady state,
k2 =

s (1− τ)
δ + r2
 1
1−α
y2 =

s (1− τ)
δ + r2
 α
1−α
where k2t =
K2t
A2tL2t
and y2t =
Y2t
A2tL2t
, which are both constant at the steady state (k2, y2). The
only di¤erence with the textbook is the introduction of the tax parameter τ : higher taxes
reduce disposable income and capital accumulation reduces. Note also that on the balanced
growth path the (pre-tax) wage rate paid to e¤ective labour (A2tL2t) is
W2t = (1− α) k
α
2 . (4)
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The government budget is assumed to balance, hence
τY2t = W1tA1tL1t (5)
where W1t is the wage cost of e¤ective labour in the pubic sector. Tax revenue raised from
the private sector nances expenditure (on labour alone) in the public sector. Following
Baumol (1967) we assume labour mobility, hence at any point in time public-and after-tax
private-sector wages must be equalized, W1t = (1− τ)W2t. Substituting (2) and (4) into (5)
therefore yields
τA2tL2tk
α
2 = (1− τ) (1− α) k
α
2A1tL1t
hence
τ
(1− τ)
=
(1− α)A1tL1t
A2tL2t
. (6)
Equation (6) establishes a convenient relationship between taxes and relative employment
in the two sectors. The higher the level of e¤ective employment in the public relative to
the private sector, then taxes must commensurately increase in order to pay their wages.
Moreover, the higher the labour share (1 − α), the higher wages are, and the higher taxes
must be, for given levels of e¤ective labour.14
Nonetheless, by itself equation (6) essentially only redenes the budget constraint: for
given employment in the two sectors there must be a particular tax rate. Ultimately the
14Note that Baumols cost disease requires r2 > r1. On inspection of (6) this would appear to imply that
the size of government falls over time. However the other necessary element of the cost disease argument is
that demand for public goods is inelastic. This means that labour endogenously shifts from the private to
the public sector to the extent that taxes have to rise in order that public sector real output keeps pace with
that of the private sector.
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actual size of the government will also depend on demand which in turn depends on gov-
ernment institutions. Here we follow Baumol (1967) and posit equal shares in total output,
hence
Y1t
Y2t
= C (7)
where C is constant and represents societys choice (or ideology) concerning the appropriate
level of public output relative to private output.15 This representation of demand implies
that output in the two sectors are perfect complements. This assumption is discussed below.
Given steady state private sector output, and using (6) then
τ
1− τ
= C (1− α) y2. (8)
This equation implicitly establishes government size (τ) as a function of the capital share
(and hence the labour share) α. Total di¤erentiation with respect to α yields
1
(1− τ)2
dτ
dα
= −Cy2 + C (1− α)
dy2
dα
hence

1 + Cαy2 (1− τ) (δ + r2)
Cy2 (1− τ)
2

dτ
dα
= ln k2 − 1 ≷ 0. (9)
The relationship between government size and the labour share may be positive or negative
depending on s(1−τ)
δ+r2
≷ e1−α. There are two e¤ects in play. Firstly (and corresponding to the
15Note that C should not be thought of as government size in the context of this paper. Government size
is dened as the expenditure share of GDP. C represents societys tastes regarding the appropriate volume
of public goods.
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minus one on the RHS of the equation) there is a negative relationship between government
size and the capital share. If the capital share goes up, the labour share falls, labour costs fall
and the size of government falls, at least holding the volume of government output constant.
The second e¤ect (corresponding to ln k2) is positive and works through the fact that a higher
capital share implies a higher steady state private sector output level. Under conditions of
Baumolian demand (7), higher private sector output requires higher public sector output to
maintain volume in the two sectors. Increased demand for output from the public sector
requires higher taxes.
Despite being quite simplistic the theory here is useful in highlighting some of the impor-
tant mechanisms, and interestingly has an ambiguous prediction on the relationship between
government size and the labour share. A falling labour share intuitively implies downward
pressure on labour costs, and a smaller government size holding all else constant. The nd-
ing that a smaller labour share simultaneously puts upward pressure on spending in volume
terms, through increased steady state private sector output is intriguing, but perhaps more
tenuous. To an important extent this nding hinges on the Baumolian demand function,
requiring constant relative output, and would change if decisions on government spending
were determined by absolute rather than relative volume concerns. Arguably public educa-
tion is provided until school leaving age, and health provision depends on demand, which
(at least for given technology) might primarily depend on demographics and incidences of
particular illnesses. It is not immediately clear that the volume of public sector provision
can or does (or even should) match that of the public sector.
Ultimately the hypothesis that the size of government will decline with the labour share
follows from two premises. The rst of these is that the labour share is representative of costs
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in the public sector. This follows clearly if we take the stark example that labour is output in
the instance of public services like nursing and one-to-one teaching. But more generally the
idea that the labour share denotes production costs is also widely used in modern macroeco-
nomics. For example Galí and Gertler (1999) show that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
has price ination depending on production costs rather than the output gap, and that pro-
duction costs are structurally dened by the labour share of income. The second premise is
price-inelastic demand. The source of the price inelasticity is an interesting question in its
own right (though not the topic of this paper). Arguably it reects tastes for public sector
goods.16 Most OECD countries adhere, albeit to varying degrees, to ideas of universalism in
provision (especially of health and education), and as such exhibit strong inertia in provision
of these types of goods, at least in terms of volume. Empirically Borcherding (1985) and
others have found demand in the OECD to be inelastic using public-sector price indices.17
The mechanism proposed here is simple, and novel. Given labour-intensive public services
and inelastic demand, expenditure on public services increases or falls when the cost of
providing those services increases or falls. The contention of this paper is that falls in the
labour share have played a part in explaining the absence of government growth observed in
recent history. The next section turns to evidence.
16One possible explanation could stem from inertia in political ideology. In addition public choice issues
may also be relevant here (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 1977).
17Borcherding (1985), Borcherding et al (2004), Henrekson and Lybeck (1988), Ferris and West (1996)
and Neck and Getzner (2007) all nd demand for public services to be price-inelastic.
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3 Evidence
Pickering and Rockey (2011) (henceforth PR) analyze the growth of government in a panel
of 17 OECD countries using annual data over the period 1960-1998. The dependent variable
is total government outlays as a percentage share of GDP, taken from the OECD Economic
Outlook database. In the present paper these data are extended to all OECD countries
until 2007 (thereafter macroeconomic conditions take a substantial toll on outlays in many
countries, hence 2008 and beyond are omitted from the analysis.)18 Figure 1 depicts these
data, which as noted in the introduction show an upward trend in all countries in the
earlier years (though to di¤ering extents), followed in general by stasis or even slight decline.
This paper builds on the previous analysis by augmenting the PR specication with data
for the labour share, and also extending the econometric analysis substantially to examine
data measured by 5-year averages - to deal with potential co-cyclicality in the data. In
addition three instrumental variables are employed to address the issue of endogeneity in the
labour share. We also distinguish between produced government services - where workers are
employed, and transfers. The latter should not be a¤ected by changes in labour costs if the
mechanism proposed here is the main driver of the correlation between government size and
the labour share. Moreover we examine how di¤erent categories of government expenditure
co-move with the labour share.
The measure of the labour share is the business sector labour share, which is also taken
18The mechanism proposed here may apply equally across institutions hence the dataset is expanded to
be as inclusive as possible. (In contrast the mechanism in Pickering and Rockey, 2011, relies on sustained
universal su¤rage, hence the reduced sample.) Thus the only restriction on data is availability. Appendix A
lists all of the data used in the analysis and their sources. A previous working paper presents results using
the smaller sample.
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from the OECD database. The business sector measure of the labour share is preferable to
the aggregate measure for three reasons. Firstly the aggregate labour share includes wages
and salaries paid to public sector employees, hence would be conated with the dependent
variable.19 Secondly the business sector labour share accords with the theory above. The
parameter α determines the labour share in the private sector alone. Thirdly it is likely
to be better measured in that business sector output (value-added) is traded in markets.
Public sector output is in most instances non-traded so measurement of true value-added,
and therefore shares of value-added, is di¢cult. As discussed above, the labour share data
display interesting and usable variation across and within countries. The mean value in this
sample is 0.66, consistent with the two thirds rule of thumb used as standard in macroeco-
nomic calibration. There is nonetheless a notable decline through the sample period in most
countries in recent years. For example for the 15 countries for which data are available in
1970, all countries except Belgium and South Korea experienced a decline in the the labour
share between 1970 and 2007.20
There are a number of important potential di¢culties relating to statistical inference
when regressing government size on the labour share. A rst issue relates to the denition of
the labour share. In particular the OECD labour share data includes employer-contributions
(social insurance) as well as salaries and wages. The potential problem here is that large
government is associated with greater employer-contributions and social insurance - hence the
labour share could be endogenous to government size. However, in raw terms the business-
sector labour share data do not seem to be systematically larger under larger public sectors
19The aggregate labour share is the ratio of total wages and salaries paid in the economy over GDP.
20This accords with Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) who document that the labour share trended
downwards in 42 out of 59 countries between 1975 and 2012.
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(e.g. Norway & Sweden, the countries with the largest governments, do not have abnormally
large labour shares). The OECD report that these contributions have not varied much over
time on average, e.g. it was 14% on average in 1975 (near the beginning of our sample), and
14% in 2005 (near the end of our sample).21 Nonetheless there has been variation in employer-
contributions within some countries, and so controlling for xed e¤ects may not by itself
rule out this as a mechanism for explaining the data. However, in regression results reported
below, when the sample is separated depending on whether or not employer-contributions
have grown over time, the estimation results are robust across the two subsamples. Hence
movements in employer-contributions do not appear to be driving the results.
More broadly the labour share itself is an endogenous variable and will also have its
own driving variables, which problematically also may independently drive government size.
This necessitates that caution should be exercised before inferring that causality runs from
the labour share to government size. One possibility is due to the economic cycle: di¤erent
macroeconomic theories posit di¤erent predictions for the cyclical behavior of the labour
share. In simple RBC models it is acyclical. In old Keynesian models emphasizing nominal
wage rigidity, the labour share can be anti-cyclical depending on the elasticity of demand for
labour. In contrast the new Keynesian literature, as exemplied by Gali and Gertler (1999),
emphasizes price-stickiness, which implies a pro-cyclical labour share. Because government
outlays in the OECD are quite strongly anticyclical (i.e. due to automatic stabilizers) there
is a danger that the labour share would be simply picking up a cyclical e¤ect on spending.
To address this problem the regression analysis includes controls for the output gap,22 and
21See http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/revenue-statistics-2014/tax-levels-and-tax-structures-1965-
2013_rev_stats-2014-5-en-fr
22The ouput gap data YGAP are derived following Persson and Tabellini (2003) using the Hodrick-
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following Persson and Tabellini (2003) the oil price interacted with an indicator variable
depending on whether the country is a net oil-importer or exporter. Common time e¤ects
are also included in the regression analysis. Moreover, following standard practice in the
empirical growth literature, the model is also estimated using ve year averages of the data
to clean out cyclicality from the data.23
At a structural level Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) show theoretically that the labour share varies with di¤erential labour- and capital-
augmenting technology and the degree of complementarity between labour and capital in
production. These technological characteristics will also drive GDP - which in turn repre-
sents the central mechanism in explaining government growth according to Wagners (1893)
law. Hence for example the labour share may increase (or fall) due to labour- (or capi-
tal) augmenting technological progress.24 Concurrently increases in GDP may also increase
government demand for Wagnerian reasons. Thus it is not impossible that under certain
conditions changes in the labour share may conate labour-share (supply) and Wagner (de-
mand) mechanisms in the econometrics. The regression analysis therefore includes time
e¤ects, the real oil price (which to some extent may drive changes in relative labour/capital
productivity) and of course real GDP per capita to account for these potential drivers.
Alternatively the labour share may also be a reection of di¤ering or changing prefer-
ences/tastes/ideology towards inequality in society. A high labour share may indicate an
egalitarian ideology where policies are set in order to increase relative rewards to workers
Prescott lter. Following their approach observations where the output gap is greater than 5% in magnitude
are omitted from the regression analysis.
23For example, see Islam (1995), and in a political economy context Besley et al (2010).
24Maarek and Orgiazzi (2015) nd that the labour share is a¤ected by the level of economic development.
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rather than owners of capital. Greater amounts of redistribution (under egalitarian ideology)
will also likely increase the size of government. Inference therefore could conate the ideolog-
ical explanation for government size with the supply-side cost explanation. The regression
analysis thus includes xed e¤ects as standard, which will control for any constant country-
specic di¤erences in ideology as well as other time-invariant characteristics. Furthermore
the analysis includes the time-varying ideology data used in PR as well as its interaction
with income.25
The empirical evidence analyses a period during which some countries experienced sig-
nicant privatisation of certain industries. Furthermore in many instances the industries
in question have often been capital-intensive hence potentially underpinning a concurrent
decline in the private sector labour share and the size of government. Schneider (2003)
documents a wave of privatisation across the OECD beginning in the 1990s. In order to
investigate this channel the sample is split at 1990, and indeed results are also reported (in
table 5) for the pre-1990 sample excluding France, Japan and the UK - the only countries with
substantial privatisation programmes pre-1990. The results are found to be robust across
the subsamples suggesting that it is not privatisation that is driving the results. Moreover
the evidence relating to the subcomponents of government expenditure (in table 4) suggests
that it is labour-intensive sectors alone which are driving the results, consistent with the
argument advanced in this paper
A further potential co-variate with both government size and the labour share is economic
openness. Cameron (1978), Rodrik (1998) and Epifani and Gancia (2012) all explore mech-
25The ideology data are taken from the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al, 2001 and Klingemann et
al, 2005).
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anisms through which government size is a¤ected by openness. Guerriero and Sen (2012)
nd that globalization has also a¤ected the labour share, though this view is contested by
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) who argue that technology is the principal driver of the
recent declines in the labour share. In order to address this potential problem openness is
included as standard as a further control variable.
As a nal additional control variable, following Kau and Rubin (2002) and Winer et al
(2008), female participation in the labour force is included in the econometric analysis. The
argument here is that increased female participation entail lower costs of tax collection -
hence government size in terms of total taxation and therefore expenditure is predicted to
increase.26
3.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results
Column 1a of table 1 contains estimation results in a regression specication extending that
used in PR, using annual data. This includes xed e¤ects, the lagged dependent variable and
a number of control variables together with the labour share data.27 In this specication
the estimated coe¢cient relating to the labour share is positive, and is signicant at the
1% level. Given the presence of the lagged dependent variable, the parameter estimates
in column 1a reect the current-period (or short-run) impact of the explanatory variables
26Ferris and West (1999) found an insignicant but negative e¤ect of female participation, on pay in the
public sector relative to the private sector, when looking at US data - contrary to the Kau and Rubin (1981,
2002) hypothesis.
27Column 1 of table 1 is the same specication as used in column 2 of table 2 in PR including the labour
share data and female participation as additional explanatory variables, using data from all OECD members
and over the longer time horizon up until 2007.
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(making the strong assumption that the labour share is exogenous).28 Column 1b presents
the corresponding long-run parameter estimates,29 illustrating the impact of particular levels
of both income and the labour share on the long-run steady-state level of government size.
The p-value for the estimated long-run coe¢cient for the labour share is 0.2%, and the
estimated e¤ect is sizable: A sustained one standard deviation (6%) exogenous increase in
the labour share is estimated to result in an eventual increase in the size of government by
7.6% of GDP.
One possible objection could lie in the measurement of the labour share. In particular self-
employment income is implicitly included in the capital share of income as the measure used
only includes labour compensation, which means that the labour share is underestimated.
This is of concern because arguably an exogenous decline in government size could lead to
a movement of workers from the public sector to self-employment, thereby explaining the
observed negative association between government size and the labour share. Nonetheless,
the OECD report that over time self-employment has been declining in most of the member
countries between 1990 and 2010.30 The declines in the labour share are thus likely due
to other factors. Moreover robustness checks are reported in table 5, with the sample split
depending on self-employment trends. The relationship between government size and the
labour share holds in both subsamples.
28Note in a regression using annual data where the xed e¤ects are dropped, the coe¢cient estimate on
lagged outlays in 0.914 with a robust standard error of 0.012. The issue of persistence is also addressed when
ve-year averages of the data are used (where the coe¢cient estimate on the lagged dependent variable is
lower still).
29Given the regression gt = αgt−1+βSt+γYt+ ... the long-run level of g is taken as g
∗ = 1
1−α
{βSt+γYt...}
= λSt+Yt.... The standard errors of the long-run parameters, λ and  are estimated using the delta method.
30See http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/07/01/04/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-
2011-61-en.
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Column 2 of table 1 repeats the analysis of column 1 using 5-year averages of the data.31
Averaging the data addresses concerns relating to the cyclicality in government size and the
labour share, and the potential spurious correlation problem.32 The results support those
found using the annual data. There is a clear positive relationship between government size
and the labour share measure, and the estimated statistical signicance is una¤ected. These
results establish that the observed correlation is not due to cyclical features in the data.
Appendix B contains full estimation results for this regression. Consistent with Pickering
and Rockey (2011) ideology and its interaction with income continue to a¤ect government
size in the extended sample. It is also evident that aging populations (the proportion of the
population aged 65 and over) positively relate to government size.33 This latter phenomenon
helps to reconcile the argument in this paper with the observation that in most countries
government size has not (substantially) fallen. For example on average across the sample
between 1987 and 2007 the proportion of the population aged over 65 increased by about
3%. Given the coe¢cient estimates reported in appendix B such an increase would ceteris
paribus be associated with increases in government size of about 5%. Over the same duration
the average business-sector labour share fell from 0.65 to 0.61 - with associated estimated
reduction in government size of 2.6%. Changing demographics thus have the capacity to
o¤set the concurrent downward trend in the labour share, in terms of the full e¤ect on
government size.
31In instances with less than ve annual observations the average is computed on the basis of available
data in order to maximize the sample size.
32The lagged dependent variable is omitted from the 5-year-average regressions because of the Nickell-bias
(which increases as the T decreases). In Table 2 we report estimation results reinstating the lagged dependent
variable using the method proposed by Bruno (2005).
33As also identied by Sanz and Velázquez (2007).
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Columns 3 (using annual data) and 4 (using 5-year averages) extend the regression results
to include time e¤ects. Time e¤ects are included to control for any common secular trend.
Whilst the parameter estimate for the labour share falls slightly in magnitude, it continues
to be statistically signicant at the 1% level in both cases.
3.2 Instrumental Variables Regression Results
So far the empirical analysis demonstrates a clear positive association between government
size and the labour share. Nonetheless the results do not establish causality, insofar that
the movements in the labour share may be endogenous to government size or indeed co-
determined by unobserved drivers - though the analysis does include a substantial set of
control variables, and the results using ve-year averages establish that cyclicality cannot
be driving the results. To further address this issue table 2 contains results instrumenting
for the labour share. With the objective of isolating exogenous movements in the labour
share three alternative instruments are employed. The rst instrument is the Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014) (hereafter, KN) measure of the relative price of investment, constructed
using data from the Penn World Table. Following KN we interpret these data to be the
outcome of technological change. In the business sector e¢ciency gains have been concen-
trated in capital-producing sectors, which in turn has induced rms to shift from labour
to capital to the extent that the labour share has declined. The second instrument is an
instance of institutional change. The creation of the European single labour market, via
the Schengen agreement, is plausibly an exogenous event - peculiar to the geography and
history of continental Europe, and with meaningful implications for the labour share within
the signatory nations.
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However, it has to be acknowledged that both these instruments could conceivably fall
foul of the excludability requirement. Technology could a¤ect demand for government ser-
vices directly, and even though the Schengen agreement was substantially constrained by
(exogenous) geography ultimately the decision to join was political and therefore feasibly
related to the size of government. We therefore also include the lagged labour share as a
third instrumental variable which has the virtue of being predetermined. Moreover using
three instruments permits validity checks in terms of both instrument strength (i.e. weak
instruments) as well as excludability. In columns (1)-(3) of table 2 each regression employs
two of the three instruments, which allows overidentication tests of whether the instruments
are correlated with the second-stage regression residuals. Any identied correlation would
cast doubt on the exclusion restriction and hence the validity of the instrument(s) used. In
the Instruments row of table 2, rst stage estimated coe¢cients and standard errors are
reported. These show that the KN instrument is particularly potent (indeed corroborating
the ndings of their original paper), and also that the lagged labour share is statistically
signicant in the rst stage.
Column 1 reports results using the KN relative price of investment measure and the
lagged labour share as instruments.34 The estimated e¤ect of the labour share on the size
of government continues to be positive and signicant. The estimated coe¢cient increases
in magnitude somewhat relative to the OLS case. The standard F-statistic for weak instru-
ments strongly rejects the null hypothesis, hence the instruments are found to have strong
explanatory power in the rst stage. Moreover the over-identication test is not rejected: the
34The IV estimation results use only the 5-year averages of the data in order to rule out any possibility of
cyclicality in the data. When used as an instrument the lagged labour share is the average of the previous
5-year period.
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p-value of the overidentication test is 0.672 - hence neither of the instruments is found to
be correlated with the main regression errors providing support for the exclusion restriction.
In the instance of column 2 results are reported using the Schengen identier and the
lagged labour share as instruments and again the labour share continues to be signicant.
In this instance over-identication is again not rejected and whilst the weak instruments F
statistic is marginally lower than the standard benchmark value of 10. Nonetheless inspection
of the rst stage regression reveals that Schengen membership is insignicant.
In column 3 KN and Schengen are used as instruments without the lagged labour share,
and the statistical signicance of the labour share in the second-stage regression holds up.
Moreover the diagnostic statistics do not reject the exclusion restriction, though again it is
clear thatKN does the work in the rst stage whilst Schengen is evidently a weak instrument.
3.3 Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Results
The results reported so far using the 5-year averages data omit the lagged dependent variable.
However government outlays are still persistent even at this frequency. In column 4 we report
results when the lagged dependent variable is included in the regression. In this specication
the labour share is instrumented using the preferred instrumental variables, KN and the
lagged labour share. Again the labour share is estimated to signicantly drive movements
in government outlays. The diagnostic tests reject weak instruments and do not reject the
over-identication restriction. Notably the KN instrument retains high signicance.35
One potential remaining issue is the Nickell (1981) bias associated with models involving
35Indeed in an unreported regression when the labour share is instrumented by KN alone the F-statistic
remains above 10 and the labour share is again highly signicant in the main regression.
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xed e¤ects and a lagged dependent variable. The bias is of the order ( 1
T
), and in the context
of the 5-year averages the maximum number of observations per country is 7 hence the bias
may be quite large. A means to correct the Nickell bias, and therefore restore the lagged
dependent variable to the 5-year averages analysis, is provided by Brunos (2005) extension
of Kiviet (1995). With the caveat that these estimators are consistent only when the cross
sectional dimension of the panel tends to innity (and here there are only 27 countries)
results using this procedure are reported in column 5 of table 2. The statistically signicant
positive relationship between government size and the labour share is maintained.
3.4 Transfers as the Dependent Variable
The central idea proposed in this paper is simple: labour costs help to determine the public
expenditure share. However, government activities, and therefore the embodied production
technologies, are diverse. In particular transfer payments involve very little in the way of pro-
duction - and such payments represent a sizeable fraction of total government expenditure in
many countries.36 Investigating the relationship between transfers and the labour share also
helps to address concerns of endogeneity. Conceivably, generosity in government provision
could enhance labour bargaining power and therefore the labour share - a potential source of
reverse causality. One might expect that this mechanism would be most pronounced in the
case of transfers. Higher transfers raise the outside option of the worker and her bargaining
power would be increased. Using data for transfers thus provides a vehicle for identifying
between this form of reverse causality, and the mechanism proposed in the paper. According
36A separate literature address the political economy of social security, as distinct from government size.
For example Tabellini (2000) discusses provision of pensions in democracies.
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to the latter there should not be a link between the labour share and transfers, whilst in the
former there should be such a link.
To measure transfers we use Social benets other than social transfers in kind from the
OECD.37 These data represent a sizable fraction of public expenditures, ranging from around
15% (for example in Australia in the early part of the sample) to around 38% (in Austria
and Germany towards the end of the sample). Columns 6 and 7 of table 2 contain regression
results using this alternative dependent variable, repeating the econometric analysis above
using the 5-year average data. Column 6 contains estimation results using OLS. The sample
size is somewhat smaller because of poorer availability of the transfers data, but importantly
the labour share is no longer statistically signicant. Similarly when we repeat the instru-
mental variables regressions in column 7 using the new dependent variable, the labour share
ceases to be signicant.38 Movements in the labour share are thus not statistically associated
with movements in the generosity of transfers. This adds some credence to the cost-based
mechanism for the labour share-government size correlation advanced in this paper.
3.5 Disaggregated Expenditure Data
The responsiveness of the size of government to labour costs depends on labour intensity, and
this clearly di¤ers across subsectors. The theoretical analysis also highlights the importance
37 Social transfers in kind represents outsourced goods and services, where the government pays the private
sector for provision of certain services. As these transfers are produced, following the logic of this paper it
seems likely that the labour share would generally a¤ect these expenditures. Exclusion is therefore preferable
in the context of trying to separate out the reverse causality mechanism outlined in the previous paragraph
from the cost-push mechanism proposed in this paper. As with the outlays data these data are divided by
GDP to give a measure of relative size. Sample sizes are slightly smaller here due to data availability.
38In this regression the KN relative price of investment measure and the lagged labour share are used as
instruments due to their superior explanatory power in the rst stage.
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of the (in)elasticity of demand and in general this will also not be identical across di¤erent
public services. For these reasons this subsection analyses how disaggregated components of
government expenditure change with the labour share.
The IMF Government Finance Statistics database provides annual disaggregated expen-
diture data by functions of government. The separate categories are: General Public Services
(GPS); Defence (DEF); Public Order and Safety (POS); Economic A¤airs (EA); Environ-
mental Protection (EP); Housing and Community Amenities (HCA); Health (HEALTH);
Recreation, Culture and Religion (RCR); Social Protection (SP).39 Table 3 contains descrip-
tive statistics of these data. By far the largest component is Social Protection - which includes
a large part of the transfers data already analyzed. However, note that some transfers are
administered through other sub-categories, and also note that SP includes the substantial
expenditure on the administrative (and in particular personnel) costs associated with pro-
vision. Other important sub-categories include General Public Services, Economic A¤airs,
Education, and Health. The latter two are often cited as areas in the public sector sus-
ceptible to cost disease. The primary component of GPS is the civil service, hence this
also is labour-intensive. However labour is relatively less important in EA is, as it includes
expenditures on energy and capital-intensive mining, manufacturing and construction.
It is harder to establish variation in terms of elasticity of demand. Arguably there are
many areas of public expenditure - in particular education and health - where provision is
determined as a matter of principle and not cost. Inelastic demand clearly follows from these
underpinnings. Nonetheless, there may be other government departments which are more
39These data are dened more fully in the IMFs Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014. Note that
data coverage for disaggregated expenditure is rather more limited than for total outlays.
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susceptible to discretionary volume changes when prices vary.
Table 4 contains regression results duplicating column 2 of table 1 using the disaggre-
gated expenditure data.40 The estimated sensitivity of expenditure (again measured as a
percentage of GDP) to the labour share varies across departments as conjectured. GPS,
POS, HEALTH, EDU and SP all correlate signicantly with the labour share. All of these
ve components parts have substantial labour inputs: GPS, HEALTH, EDU and SP are
labour-intensive as discussed above, whilst POS also likely adheres to the requirements of
labour intensity (again because labour is the primary element in policing) and indeed inelas-
tic demand.
Amongst the exceptions, defence expenditure is seemingly determined by other factors
(both income and ideology are important here), and indeed to an important extent has
substantial capital/equipment costs. EA includes expenditures on fuel and energy, whilst
grants (i.e. transfers) are a substantial element of EP. It is possible to conjecture that demand
for HCA (which also is relatively capital intensive for example including water supply costs)
and RCR (and perhaps EP also) is relatively elastic. Expenditure in these areas is generally
more subject to discretion than say HEALTH and EDU.
Whilst a full analysis of the determinants of the separate components of expenditure
is beyond the scope of this paper, broadly the data are supportive of the hypothesis that
the labour share matters most when production is intensive in labour, and when demand is
plausibly inelastic.
40Ideally the regression specication would include the lagged dependent variable, though this typically
reduces the sample from 95 to 67 observations.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
It is natural to ask whether the results are specic to a group of countries or a specic
time period. In table 5 the sample is split at 1990. The subsample prior to this year thus
excludes Eastern European countries, and also the majority of cases of privatisation noted
by Schneider (2003). Column 1 uses the same specication as column 4 of table 2 but using
pre-1990 observations only. Column 2 further excludes France, Japan and the UK from
this sample - countries where there was also sizable privatisation in the 1980s. Column 3
reports results for the post-1990 subsample (including all countries). As can be seen in all
cases government size is signicantly positively correlated with the labour share. Indeed the
point-estimate is highest in absolute terms for column 2 - which rules out privatisation as
the primary driving force for the correlation.
A further robustness check distinguishes between countries in which employers manda-
tory social security contributions increased or fell over time. As noted above this could
potentially explain the observed correlation between government size and the labour share.
According to the OECD Revenue Statistics (2014), between the years 1980 and 2008 these
increased in Korea, Turkey, Japan, Finland, Greece, Canada, Ireland, Belgium, the UK,
the US, Austria and Switzerland. In contrast they were unchanged in Australia and New
Zealand, and fell in Denmark, Germany, Norway, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Italy, Sweden and Spain. Column 4 of table 5 contains regression results for the
former group of countries, and column 5 contains results for the latter group. If employer-
contributions explain the previous results, then the coe¢cient estimate on the labour share
should be signicantly larger for the former group. The results show that although the coef-
cient estimate is slightly lower for the subsample of countries where employer contributions
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fell, the coe¢cient estimates are not signicantly di¤erent.
Similarly, country-specic trends in self-employment could potentially confound the re-
sults. As noted above self-employment has fallen over time in the majority of countries
though to varying extents.41 Columns 6 and 7 of table 5 distinguish between countries in
which there were strong falls in self-employment and those in which reductions were more
modest or even positive.42 The coe¢cient estimate is somewhat higher for the subsample of
countries where the extent of self-employment hasnt fallen, though statistical signicance
remains high in both subsamples.
4 Conclusion
The size of government has intrigued researchers for well over 100 years. Previous explana-
tions have predominantly focussed on demand-side explanations, beginning with Wagners
law, but also encompassing ideology, changing demographics, the distribution of income and
political economy explanations. The very simple idea that costs also play some part in de-
termining government size has been under-explored. This paper argues that labour costs,
measured by the labour share of income in the business sector, are an important determinant
of the size of government. Under conditions of inelastic demand for government, the size of
government increases with labour costs. Data from the OECD provide consistent evidence of
a positive association between the size of government and the business sector labour share.
This holds across a wide range of econometric specications and when the labour share is
41For example between 1980 and 2008 fell by 15% of civilian employment in Japan, and fell by 2.4% in
the US. The UK is an exception - self-employment rose by 5.3% over the same period.
42Note that data coverage on self-employment rates is imperfect. The analysis is restricted to countries
for which data are available.
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instrumented with variables encapsulating technology, institutional variation and predeter-
mined movements. In contrast, transfer spending exhibits no relationship with the labour
share. Whilst we would certainly admit the possibility of alternative mechanisms linking
government size and the labour share, we nd that it is only the labour-intensive elements of
government which increase in relative expenditure terms when then labour share increases.
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Figure 1: The Size of Government, 1960-2007
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Figure 2: The Average Labour Share of Income, Schengen-Area and
Non-Schengen-Area.
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(1a) (1b) (2) (3a) (3b) (4)
L.Outlays
0.850
(0.025)∗∗∗
0.849
(0.030)∗∗∗
SHARE
19.22
(3.921)∗∗∗
127.3
(33.1)∗∗∗
65.54
(12.29)∗∗∗
14.35
(3.346)∗∗∗
95.45
(26.25)∗∗∗
40.57
(11.57)∗∗∗
Obs 762 172 762 172
No. Countries 29 29 29 29
Data Annual 5-year averages Annual 5-year averages
Time E¤ects? No No Yes Yes
R2 (within) 0.89 0.40 0.92 0.65
Table 1: Basic Estimation Results
Notes: Panel regressions of Government Outlays as a percentage share of GDP including xed e¤ects, PROP1564, PROP65,
TRADE, Y GAP , OIL_EX, FP , Y P , ideo and its interaction with Y P as used in PR. L.OUTLAY S is the lagged dependent
variable. SHARE is the business-sector labour share of income. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Columns
(1b) and (3b) contain long-run parameter estimates, with standard errors estimated by the delta method. The cyclical control
variables, Y GAP , OIL_EX, and OIL_IM are excluded in the regressions using 5-year averages of the data. *, **, and ***
respectively denote signicance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.OUTLAY S
0.493
(0.079)∗∗∗
0.617
(0.075)∗∗∗
SHARE
103.1
(23.21)∗∗∗
50.05
(22.90)∗∗
87.29
(22.27)∗∗∗
59.18
(16.57)∗∗∗
47.79
(11.97)∗∗∗
1.630
(4.670)
9.334
(10.05)
Obs 132 154 132 128 166 130 117
No. Countries 27 27 27 27 28 28 27
Data 5-year averages 5-year averages 5-year averages 5-year averages 5-year averages 5-year averages 5-year averages
Method IV IV IV IV Bruno (2005) OLS IV
Instruments
KN
−0.220
(0.048)∗∗∗
SHAREit−1
0.249
(0.074)∗∗∗
SCHENGEN
0.009
(0.007)
SHAREit−1
0.356
(0.070)∗∗∗
KN
−0.221
(0.042)∗∗∗
SCHENGEN
0.013
(0.009)
KN
−0.263
(0.068)∗∗∗
SHAREit−1
0.182
(0.090)∗∗
KN
−0.227
(0.059)∗∗∗
SHAREit−1
0.217
(0.080)∗∗∗
F 11.93 9.661 8.746 12.50 17.50
pχ2 0.670 0.491 0.146 0.646 0.213
Table 2: Further Estimation Results
Notes: In columns (1)-(5) the dependent variable is outlays. IV is estimated by two-stage-least squares. First stage coe¢cients
are reported below the named instruments in the Instruments row. F is an F-statistic for the statistical signicance of the
instruments in the rst stage regression. pχ2 is the p-value for the Chi-squared test of overidentifying restrictions. Column (5)
contains results using the Bruno (2005) Bias Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator for unbalanced panels. In
column (6)-(7) transfer payments is the dependent variable (Social benets other than social transfers in kind as a % share of
GDP). See also notes for table 1 for other details.
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Variable Full Denition Obs Mean Std. Dev
GPS General Public Services 576 6.813 2.598
DEF Defence 576 1.869 1.463
POS Public Order and Safety 576 1.667 0.453
EA Economic A¤airs 576 4.766 1.872
EP Environmental Protection 534 0.744 0.303
HCA Housing and Community Amenities 576 0.827 0.431
HEALTH Health 576 6.103 1.295
RCR Recreation, Culture and Religion 576 1.159 0.583
EDU Education 576 5.617 1.211
SP Social Protection 576 15.449 5.143
Table 3: Disaggregated Government Expenditure Data
Notes: Data are annual and expressed as a percentage of GDP. A detailed description of
these subcomponents is provided in the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014.
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Dependent Variable GPS DEF POS EA EP
SHARE
19.14
(8.112)∗∗
−0.089
(1.359)
2.384
(1.125)∗∗
4.329
(6.441)
0.791
(0.686)
Obs 95 95 95 95 87
No. Countries 29 29 29 29 28
R2 (within) 0.38 0.62 0.48 0.44 0.36
Dependent Variable HCA HEALTH RCR EDU SP
share
0.948
(0.985)
6.812
(3.047)∗∗
0.632
(1.315)
8.125
(2.391)∗∗∗
14.699
(4.770)∗∗∗
Obs 95 95 95 95 95
No. Countries 29 29 29 29 29
R2 (within) 0.20 0.73 0.28 0.44 0.39
Table 4: Disaggregated Government Expenditure Estimation Results
Notes: Regression specication is the same as column 2 of table 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.OUTLAY S
0.196
(0.124)
0.117
(0.123)
0.367
(0.109)∗∗∗
0.637
(0.139)∗∗∗
0.692
(0.106)∗∗∗
0.677
(0.116)∗∗∗
0.398
(0.120)∗∗∗
SHARE
69.85
(21.00)∗∗∗
75.13
(17.55)∗∗∗
40.69
(14.40)∗∗∗
60.85
(23.76)∗∗∗
50.39
(15.96)∗∗∗
48.34
(16.53)∗∗∗
85.96
(24.10)∗∗∗
Obs 69 57 97 62 84 64 68
No. Countries 19 16 28 9 12 10 9
Data 5-year aver-
ages
5-year aver-
ages
5-year aver-
ages
5-year aver-
ages
5-year aver-
ages
5-year aver-
ages
5-year aver-
ages
Method Bruno (2005) Bruno (2005) Bruno (2005) Bruno (2005) Bruno (2005) Bruno (2005) Bruno (2005)
Sample Pre-1990 Pre-1990 -
France, Japan
& UK
Post-1990 Employer-
Contributions
increase
Employer-
Contributions
decrease
Self-
Employment
reductions
Stable Self-
Employment
Table 5: Robustness Checks
Notes: The dependent variable is outlays. Estimation is via the Bruno (2005) Bias Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable
estimator for unbalanced panels. See also notes for table 1 for other details.
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Appendix A: List of variables
Variable Description Source
OUTLAY S General government outlays as a percentage of GDP OECD Economic Outlook
PROP1564 Proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64 years old World Development Indicators
PROP65 Proportion of the population aged over 65 years old World Development Indicators
TRADE Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as
a share of GDP
World Development Indicators
Y P Income per capita in $000s of 2005 prices (PPP) Penn World Tables
ideo Median voter ideology Pickering and Rockey (2011) and
authors calculations
FP Female labour force as a percentage of the female population
between 15 and 64 years.
OECD
SHARE Business sector labour income share OECD Statistics
OIL_EX Price of oil in US dollars times a dummy equal to 1 if net exports
of oil are positive, 0 otherwise
US Energy Information Adminis-
tration
OIL_IM Price of oil in US dollars times a dummy equal to 1 if net exports
of oil are negative, 0 otherwise
US Energy Information Adminis-
tration
Y GAP Deviation of aggregate output from its trend value in percent,
computed as the di¤erence between the natural logarithm of real
GDP in a country and its country-specic trend (obtained using
the Hodrick-Prescott lter).
World Development Indicators
KN The Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) measure of the relative
investment prices (using Penn World Tables data)
Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014)
SCHENGEN Dummy variable set equal to one if the country is a member of
the Schengen Area in that year
European Commission
GPS Government expenditure on General Public Services as a per-
centage share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
DEF Government expenditure on Defence as a percentage share of
GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
POS Government expenditure on Public Order and Safety as a per-
centage share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
EA Government expenditure on Economic A¤airs as a percentage
share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
EP Government expenditure on Environmental Protection as a per-
centage share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
HCA Government expenditure on Housing and Community Amenities
as a percentage share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
HEALTH Government expenditure on Health as a percentage share of
GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
RCR Government expenditure on Recreation, Culture and Religion as
a percentage share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
EDU Government expenditure on Education as a percentage share of
GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
SP Government expenditure on Social Protection as a percentage
share of GDP
IMF Government Finance Statis-
tics
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Appendix B: Full Regression Results
Variable Estimates
PROP1564
0.733
(0.460)
PROP65
1.664
(0.428)∗∗∗
TRADE
−0.017
(0.037)
Y P
−0.186
(0.138)
ideo
−48.45
(16.74)∗∗∗
Y P∗ideo
1.244
(0.551)∗∗
FP
0.012
(0.160)
SHARE
65.54
(12.29)∗∗∗
Obs 172
No. Countries 29
Data 5-year averages
Time E¤ects? No
R2 (within) 0.40
Notes: Full regression results of column 2 table 1.
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